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Abstract
A study was conducted to evaluate how workers predict manufacturing
production potentials given positively and negatively framed information.
Findings indicate the existence of a bias toward positive information and
suggest that this bias may be reduced with experience but is never the less
maintained.  Experts err in the same way non experts do in differentially
processing negative and positive information.  Additionally, both experts
and non experts tend to overestimate production potentials in a positive
direction.  The authors propose that these biases should be addressed with
further research including cross domain analyses and consideration in
training, workplace design, and human performance modeling.
Background
Early cognitive theory proposed a mathematical notion of decision makers
as ‘intuitive statisticians’ (Peterson and Beach, 1967) in judging
probabilities.  Further research indicated that, among other things, decision
makers tend to be more conservative in predictions than a statistical model
would indicate (Edwards, 1968) and that human decisions are a function of
heuristics and biases (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  Taylor and Brown
(1988) propose that cognitive processing mechanisms impose filters on
incoming information, distorting it in a positive direction and isolating
negative information.  This serves as a basis for errors of inference in
decision making due to the inaccuracy of selective processing and a bias
toward positively framed information.  As noted by Kuhlberger (1995) the
way in which problems are presented may help reduce or eliminate framing
effects and associated biases.
It has been noted that experts and non experts may experience the same
biases in decision making (Ericsson and Staszewski, 1989).  The extent to
which the positive bias is retained or disappears in expert decision making
has not been explored in prior applied research.
Method
A study was conducted to investigate how levels of expertise and the
framing of information affect predictions in an industrial workplace.
Facility operations management was interested in learning how employees
integrate and utilize positive and negative information about production
potentials.
Thirty-two subjects were randomly selected from a total population of
400 employees working in various job positions at a manufacturing facility.
Years of industry experience and formal education were noted for each
subject.  The median number of years of experience and the median level of
formal education were calculated for the group, and two levels of expertise
were identified.  Experts were defined as those subjects with greater than the
median level of experience and education, and non experts were those with
less than the median level of experience or education.
Subjects were asked to predict future production percentages based on
sample production rates from two preceding months.  Production evidence
was presented in two formats: yield percentage rates, or the quantity of
remaining useable materials from which quality products can be
manufactured; and scrap percentage rates, or the portion of remaining
unusable materials.  High yield and low scrap rates are considered favorable,
positive production conditions, while low yield and high scrap are less
favorable, negative conditions in the manufacturing industry.
Company officials affirmed that the sample yield and scrap rates used in
this study were representative of facility production levels.  Inconsistent sets
of information were incorporated in the prediction task to further provide
ecological validity, as real world decisions are rarely based on consistent
evidence.  The order of presentation of tasks was randomized and the
presented evidence was counterbalanced to control for order effects.
Results and discussion
Analyses of results examined differences between experts’ and non experts’
predictions given yield or scrap evidence.  The unit of analysis for
descriptive and quantitative computations was the algebraic difference
between the mean of the presented evidence and the subjects’ prediction of a
future percentage.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 display the mean predictions of experts’ and non
experts’ for future production levels, based on scrap and yield evidence
respectively.  In each graph, horizontal and diagonal reference lines are
provided to help discriminate subjects’ performance.  As illustrated in the
figures, non experts displayed less symmetry in responding to negative and
positive evidence (p<.05).  They tended to predict future levels much closer
to the presented evidence when the evidence was of a positive nature than
when it was negative.  In contrast, experts’ predictions were significantly
(p<.05) closer to the presented evidence across all levels of previous
production output.  However, both groups responded differently to the
positive and negative evidence (p<.01), although this result was less
pronounced among experts.
Results indicated that both experts and non experts predicted more
favorable, positive production outcomes than would be calculated
arithmetically.  As noted in Table 1, subjects provided predictions that were
more positive than the evidence warranted for both scrap- and yield-based
sample production rates (p<.01).  Table 2 shows the percentage of subjects
who overestimated production outcomes.  Overall, the majority of subjects
in this study responded to both the yield and scrap evidence with excessively
positive predictions.  An interpretation of this finding is that both groups of
subjects placed too little importance upon negative evidence, resulting in
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Table 1
Predicted production levels
Predictions based
on Scrap evidence
(mean = 5)
Predictions based
on Yield evidence
(mean = 95)
Difference
Experts 4.75 95.27 + .24
Non Experts 4.43 95.15 +.36
Difference +.41 +.21
Table 2
Percentage of overly positive predictions
Predictions based
on Scrap evidence
Predictions based
on Yield evidence Total
Expert
Overestimates
60% 70% 65%
Non Expert
Overestimates
73% 82% 77%
Total 76% 67%
overestimation of future manufacturing outcomes.  It should be noted,
however, that a greater percentage of subjects in the non expert group
provided overly positive production predictions.  This supports the notion
that expertise may reduce the positive bias in information processing.
The data indicate more difficulty in processing negative information than
positive information in both yield and scrap tasks.  Higher levels of expertise
were associated with closer approximations to a statistical assessment of
production performance, but subjects in both groups displayed at least some
overestimation of future outcomes.  These findings suggest that even experts
fail to integrate positive and negative evidence equally.  Work experience
and education may moderate the tendency to under utilize negative
information, but it does not eliminate this bias.
Previous research has shown that experts tend to be more coherent in
their representation of tasks (Gaeth and Shanteau, 1984).  According to this
finding, experts should have displayed less variability in their responses
across scrap and yield scenarios in the present study.  However, experts
showed less variability when responding to evidence expressed as yield but
not in scenarios with scrap evidence (p<.05).  A possible explanation for this
may be that decision makers, regardless of expertise, find it easier to
integrate evidence when it has a positive meaning (e.g., amount of yield)
rather than a negative meaning (e.g., amount of scrap).  This interpretation is
consistent with the general conclusion of other studies regarding the
facilitative role of positive evidence on human information processing
(Matlin and Stang, 1978; Taylor and Brown, 1988; Reece and Matthews,
1993).
Differences in processing between levels of expertise and differential
processing of negative and positive information for both experts and non
experts were confirmed with the results of this study.  These findings are in
line with other documented research (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981)
suggesting that decision makers may process and utilize information
differently depending on the framing of the problem.
Conclusions
Our findings indicate that the bias toward positively framed information
does exist.  Expertise may improve processing and integration of negative
information and reduce this bias.  However, even experts tend to process
negative and positive information differently.  Additionally, this study
substantiated the theory that decision makers tend to predict more favorable
outcomes than evidence would dictate.
To transfer these research findings to workplace applications, several
methods are proposed.  Operations management could utilize this
information about judgment biases in workplace training.  The intent would
be to help decision makers improve accuracy in prediction through
awareness of possible biases, and training workers to consider all aspects of
presented information before making judgments.
If information is more readily attended to when framed in a positive
manner, display designs and information presentation formats should be
oriented accordingly.  For example, in the manufacturing industry, status
displays providing yield data would facilitate more accurate and complete
information processing in predictions of plant production levels.
Another application for the results of this study is in the analysis of
worker performance.  Human reliability models account for many factors,
including the cognitive components of worker behavior.  It is suggested that
the bias toward positive, favorable information should be considered as a
potential performance shaping factor in assessments of predictive judgment
tasks.
Further research is needed to assess whether the phenomena noted in this
study similarly impact predictive decision making performance in other
domain applications.  In conclusion, differential processing of negative and
positive information should be considered as a cognitive component of error
producing contexts in applied decision making, and accommodated for in
training, system design and performance reliability analyses.
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